A Gift for An Autocrat: Failed Coups

Abstract

This article examines how different types of coups influence the repressive strategies employed by leaders, with a particular focus on the post-coup political opportunity structure. These structures shape both the scope and severity of repression. While high-cost, high-benefit repression, such as extrajudicial killings and disappearances, consolidates power after successful coups, failed coups prompt leaders to adopt low-cost, low-benefit repression methods like political imprisonment and torture, which minimize international and domestic backlash. The study finds that successful coups lead to an increase in high-cost, high-benefit repression, whereas failed coups result in more low-cost, low-benefit repression. Additionally, regime-change coups lead to more extensive repression than reshuffling coups, as they transform the political system. This paper contributes to the repression literature by providing a framework for understanding how leaders’ choices vary based on the costs, benefits, and political opportunities following different coup outcomes.